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Theorypredicts that goal-setting attenuates impulsiveness and therebyhelpspeople to reachhigher
long-term threshold levels of consumption, wealth or health. This may imply that people who
set goals in short-distance running events are more likely to participate in longer distance runs in
the future. We investigate this by analyzing finishing times in over 7,000major running events of
different distances organized in theNetherlands between 1996-2016. We assume that bunching at
round finishing times is indicative of goal-setting by a runner. In line with Allen et al. (2017), we
find strong evidence for bunching at all distances and we find that for the longer distances men
bunch more than women. However, runners who bunch are not any more likely to switch to
longer distances than others and this is also true for younger runners, who are generally consid-
ered more impulsive and thus would benefit more from goal-setting.
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Optimization is a central premise in most of economic theory. The life-cycle model of consumption
for example assumes that people smooth their consumption to attain the highest life-time utility. In
practice, problems of self-control pose an important impediment to reaching this pinnacle of utility.
Goal-setting may help to reign in self-control problems. Indeed, people often set (intermediate) goals
to ease their intertemporal planning problems in optimizing their long-run well-being. We set targets
on how often we want to visit the gym, howmuch money we set aside or spend on specific consump-
tion items and howmuch time or money we spend on others.
Heath et al. (1999) is one of the early studies that proposes that goals serve as reference points. Fol-
lowing up on this, recent theoretical research has shown that goal-setting can assist time-inconsistent
agents in self-regulation and to reach more ambitious long-run objectives (Koch and Nafziger, 2011;
Hsiaw, 2013). Goal-setting may in particular help to attenuate impulsiveness. At the empirical side,
Harding andHsiaw (2014) provide evidence on the effectiveness of goal-setting in reducing residential
energy consumption. In general however, field evidence of the effectiveness of goal-setting in intertem-
poral optimization and the relation between short-term goals and longer-run objectives is scarce. This
paper aims to contribute to filling this gap by reporting on the role goal-setting plays in the sports life-
time career of runners. To this end, we employ a novel data set containing over three million finishing
times of one million unique runners participating in over seven thousand running events of different
lengths. Our main objective is to empirically identify whether goal-setting in shorter distance runs
predicts future participation in longer-distance runs. Moreover, evidence shows that impulsiveness
decreases with age (Eysenck et al., 1985), which suggests that setting time goals may especially help
younger people to obtain their long-term running objectives.
We lack direct information on the time goal runners set, therefore we operationalize our hypoth-
esis by assuming that finishing at a round time is indicative of runners having set a time goal. This
assumption receives justification from the closely related studies by Allen et al. (2017) and Markle et
al. (forthcoming). Allen et al. (2017) convincingly show thatmarathon runners excessively bunch just
before round finishing times such as 3h, 3h30m and 4h. Moreover, by the availability of split times
they can establish that runners speed up in the last stretch when this allows them to finish within a
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round time limit.1 In a field study, Markle et al. (forthcoming) explicitly asked marathon runners
prior to the event to state their time goal, the importance of meeting this goal, and their fastest fin-
ishing times in previous 10k and half-marathon runs. They find that marathon runners experience a
jump in satisfaction at the point where the finishing time equals the reference point.2
Figure 1: Empirical age distribution different running distances
Themain analysis in this paper focuses on the role of bunching in planning. The theoretical work
by Hsiaw (2013) predicts a connection between goal-setting and attaining longer-run objectives. In
our context, this implies that runners who do not coincidentally participate in a run but aim to at-
tain a longer-run objective like reaching a higher fitness level benefit from setting time goals. Just as
the time goals, these longer-run objectives are not directly observed. For this reason, we assume that
future participation in longer distance runs is correlated with an agent having longer-run sports ob-
jectives. In that case, we expect a positive correlation at the individual level between the propensity to
bunch at a round time and future participation in longer distance runs. Of course, the causality may
run in both directions: individuals with long-run objectives may be more likely to set time-goals but
successfully setting time goals may also induce people to formulate longer horizon objectives. In fact,
1Allen et al. (2016, p. 14) state, without reporting estimates, that they also find evidence of bunching for the shorter 10
mile and half marathon distances.
2Other studies using running data or sports data more generally to study planning problems using running include
Grant (2016) and Pope and Simonsohn (2011). Bunching is also an important and much studied phenomenon in other
areas than sports. See Kleven (2016) for an excellent review of this literature.
3
Hsiaw (2013)’s model also does not offer guidance regarding the direction of causality.
The earlier cited work by Allen et al. (2017) and Markle et al. (forthcoming) also considers the
idea that the observed bunching at round times may result from runners having time goals that act as
reference points. However, while we consider the connection between these time goals and long-term
objectives like participating in longer distance runs, they take a within-race perspective and by and
large ignore the ‘career’ of a runner across races. Allen et al. (2017) find evidence that within a race,
runners plan and pace towards round reference points and Markle et al. (forthcoming) show that
marathon runners with explicit single-run time goals strive to meet them. Allen et al. (2017) plausibly
rule out that the round number bunching in their data is driven by explicit rewards such as qualifying
for the Boston marathon, or by institutional details such as the presence of pacesetters. This however
leaves the question which underlying behavioral primitive may lead to round time bunching. Is it
just a cognitive phenomenon (we are wired such that we naturally compare our running results with
round reference points) or do these reference points help to reach more distant objectives?3 This is
the question we address by considering the connection between round number bunching and future
participation in longer-distance runs.
As a second contribution, this paper complements and extends previous empirical work on run-
ning data in two important ways. First, the group of people that run marathons arguably is a highly
selected group likely to be stronglymotivated by long-run objectives related to health and sporty aspi-
rations.4 Moreover, as Figure 1 shows, presumably because of the longer distance, people start running
(half) marathons at a later age than the shorter distances. The youngest marathon runners are about
twenty years old, for the 10k this is about twelve years. Besides the age-distance relation, many people
who have run shorter distances are likely to drop out and never get to running longer distances such as
the (half) marathon. For these reasons, the question whether the findings on bunching by marathon
runners extend to a more general pool of runners, running shorter distances, is of interest in its own
right. Exactly this is what the first part of our analysis aims to accomplish by replicating the findings by
Allen et al. (2017) for a broader population of runs including marathons as well as shorter distances.
3Pun intended.
4The “52 reasons to run amarathon” of theRunner’sWorldmagazine lists “nice quads/calves/buttocks/abs” as reasons
9 to 12 (https://www.runnersworld.com/chatter/52-reasons-to-run-a-marathon, visitedNovember 10,
2017).
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Our key empirical findings are the following: First, we replicate the findings of Allen et al. (2017),
not only for the marathon but also for the shorter distances 10k and 21k. We graphically present the
distribution of finishing times and estimate the counterfactual distribution, which allows us to iden-
tify the excess mass in the distribution prior to the reference time. Using bootstrapping, we report
t-statistics of the estimated counterfactual number of runners. We find evidence of bunching for al-
most all distances, observing the highest excessmass of 32.9% in the bunching region of finishing times
in the marathon. The reference times corresponding to the top three regions with the highest excess
mass in the marathon are the 3h, 4h and 3h30m region. This top three coincides with the findings of
Allen et al. (2017). For shorter distances we find a moderate amount of excess mass, reaching a maxi-
mum of 11%. While the highest number of finishers is in the 10k run, there exists only around 4% of
excess mass in the distribution observed at 40 and 50 minutes.
Second, making use of available background information on runners, we investigate the origins
of bunching. We analyse the relationship between the probability to bunch for a given distance and
runner/event specific variables such as age, gender, running experience, being member of a athletics
club and whether or not the run is a contest. In this part of the analysis we will restrict the bunching
period from 2m to 75 seconds. This more restrictive definition is chosen to mitigate the possibility
that finishing times will bemisclassified as bunching times when they fall into the bunching period by
pure chance. We find that the probability to bunching reduces with age for distances up to 10k and
increases with the cumulative number of kilometers run. Female runners are more likely than men to
bunch in shorter distances, but the opposite holds for longer distances. When the cumulative distance
run serves as a good proxy for experience, we find an invertedU-shape relation between the propensity
to bunch and experience.
Finally we analyse the running career of individuals, questioning whether bunching in shorter
distance runs predicts future participation in longer distance runs. Our regression estimates show
that runners who finish at a round time goals are not anymore likely to switch to longer distances than
others. This negative result continues to hold if we zoom in on the younger runners, who allegedly
are more impulsive and thus would benefit more from goal-setting. In other words, we do not find




Hsiaw (2013) shows in a theoretical model that goal-setting can assist time-inconsistent agents to reach
more ambitious long-run objectives. To motivate and set the stage for the empirical analysis that fol-
lows, we briefly introduce her model.5 Hsiaw (2013, p. 604) considers the continous-time optimal
stopping problem of an infinitely lived agent who has the option to invest in a project. At time t, the
agent knows current value of the project’s payoff xt ∈ [0,∞). Based on this information, she has to
decide whether to stop or wait. When she waits, the development of the project’s payoff is described
as a geometric Brownian motion: dxt = µxtdt + σxtdz, with z a standard Wiener process, µ the
average growth rate of xt and σ its standard deviation per unit time. When the agent stops at time
t¯, the project yields a lump-sum terminal payoff xt¯ and she incurs a stopping cost equal to I > 0.
Hsiaw interprets the value xt as a wealth level. Given our sports setting, we will instead view xt as a
personal health payoff and correspondingly consider the project to be an investment in one’s health.
In the empirical part, we operationalize this by assuming that running longer distances generates a
higher underlying level of health. In this context, an agent “waits” as long as she continues to partici-
pate in official runs and “stops” when she quits participation. We readily concede that for our health
interpretation of xt, the geometric Brownian motion assumption is more problematic than when xt
is considered to represent wealth. In fact, we implicitly assume that by stopping an agent can lock
in a health level, whereas her health may improve or deteriorate when she continues to participate in
official runs. The model does neither include interim payoffs or costs prior to stopping, that is, run-
ning activities do not generate immediate payoffs or cost. This however is without loss of generality,
including an observable stochastic flow payoff leads to qualitatively similar results (Hsiaw, 2013, fn. 3).
The agent’s time preferences are modeled according to the continuous-time hyperbolic discount-
ing model formulated by Harris and Laibson (2013). At any time s, the agent dissects time into a
“present” of (stochastic) length τs and a “future” that starts at time s+τs and lasts forever. The essence
is that in the present the agent does not know exactly when the future will arrive but she knows that
5For further details, we refer to Hsiaw (2013).
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at that time s+ τs, she will be replaced by a new self who will control decision-making from then on
till the next future time s + τs + τs+τs . The possibility for present-biased preferences is introduced
with the discount function. Each self s is governed by a stochastic discount functionDs(t):
Ds(t) =
 e−ρ(t−s) if t ∈ [s, s+ τs),βe−ρ(t−s) if t ∈ [s+ τs,∞), (1)
with β ∈ [0, 1] and ρ > 0.6 The parameter β is a measure of the impatience or impulsiveness of the
agent. When β = 1, the preferences in equation (1) are akin to those of a time-consistent exponential
discounter, for values β < 1, the agent is biased towards the present.
The agent’s utility at the stopping time is the sum of a consumption utility and a comparison-
utility that depends on a reference point:
u(xt¯|rt¯; I) = xt¯ − I + η(xt¯ − I − rt¯), (2)
with η ≥ 0 and reference point rt¯. The agent’s consumptionutility of stopping at time t¯ simply equals
her terminal payoff net of stopping cost. The agent also incurs the comparison utility at the time of
stopping, that is, no comparison utility is received when waiting.7 Comparison utility is modeled as
a linear function with no kink at the reference point. In other words, the agent does not exhibit loss
aversion.8 The reference point rt¯ is formed by the agent’s goal at time t¯.
The parameter η represents the agent’s degree of reference-dependence or ‘goal commmitment’.
The reference point is endogenously determined. However, the decision making agent at time s, ‘self
s’, faces a goal rs set by her previous self and she cannot change this during her lifetime. In a similar
vein, the future self s + τs inherits a goal rs+τs set by self s. It is this “goal stickiness” that enables
the agent to carry forward goal commitment: the agent is committed to evaluate her decisions against
an inherited reference point. To close the model, it is assumed that each self’s inherited goals are con-
6The restriction ρ > µ guarantees that the agent never finds it optimal to wait forever.
7Hsiaw justifies thismodeling choicewith references to the literature onmental accounting that provides evidence that
individuals only experience paper gains and losses only when they liquidate their assets (Odean, 1998; Thaler, 1999).
8This is contrast to Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006, 2007). Hsiaw (2013) shows that the loss aversion assumption is not
needed for goals to affect behavior. The absence of loss aversion is also the reason that the second part is referred to as
‘comparison utility’ instead of ‘gain-loss utility’.
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strained by rational expectations. Moreover, agents are assumed to be sophisticated in the sense that
they are aware of the present-biasedness of their future selves.
At any time s, the agent chooses the stopping rule that determines a (random) stopping time t¯




withEs the conditional expectation at time s.
The central prediction on equilibrium behavior that follows from this model, relevant to our set-
ting is the following:9
By inducing more patient behavior, reference dependence attenuates impulsiveness in a
stationary equilibrium with endogenous goals: ∂x¯/∂η > 0.
In other words, reference-dependence (high η) serves as a countervailing power to impulsiveness
(low β). However, another implication relevant for our setting but not made explicit byHsiaw is that
the impact of reference dependence in attaining a threshold payoff is decreasing in the impulsiveness
of the individual: ∂2x¯/∂η∂β > 0.10 That is, goal-setting is less effective in increasing the threshold x¯
the more impulsive the agent is.
2.1 Research questions
What are the implications of thismodel for bunching if we assume that bunching at round times is the
result of reference-dependent preferences, specifically, time-goal setting of runners? The first implica-
tion is that bunching should not be observed when agents attach zero weight (η = 0) to comparison
utility. Allen et al. (2017) have identified bunching behavior in marathons, suggesting that η > 0 and
runners do set time-goals. The first part of our analysis will add to this evidence, for shorter distances
as well.
9Proposition 2 in Hsiaw (2013).





I with η < γ¯ − 1,
γ¯ > 1 and γ¯ a function of β. Denote ∂γ¯/∂β ≡ φ and γ¯ − 1− η ≡ θ > 0. Then ∂2x¯∂β∂η = φ(1 + η + γ¯)I/θ3 > 0.
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As an intermediate step in answering the question regarding the connection between short-term
time goals and long-term objectives, we relate the propensity to bunch to a number of runner and
race characteristics. How does bunching vary by age, gender, running experience and the distance
of the run? Next we delve into the question to which extent bunching in shorter distances predicts
future participation in longer distance runs. To this end, we limit our sample to the finishing times
of runners who at a given point in time did not participate in a run of length `. We define a dummy-
variable which takes on the value 1 if this runner will in the future participate in a run of length ` or
more and 0 otherwise. To find the incremental effect of bunching on the probability to move to a
higher distance, we regress this variable on a bunching dummy and a host of other variables. Hsiaw
(2013) finds that individuals who put higher weight on comparison utility will set (and reach) higher
goals. Evidence of a correlation between bunching and longer distance participation would be in line
with this model. As stated above, one implication of the model is for more impulsive agents, setting
goals is less effective in increasing the threshold x¯. This implies that when runners set round time-
goals not solely for immediate gratification but to accomplish longer-term objectives, exemplified by
running longer distances, our bunching dummy is a better predictor of future running distances in
less impulsive subpopulations. Given evidence from psychology that females aremore impulsive than
males and that impulsiveness is decreasing with age, we expect the correlation between bunching and
longer-distance participation to be higher for males and older runners.
3 Data
Our data are retrieved from a public site www.uitslagen.nl that collects the results of almost all
major running events organized in the Netherlands from 1996 to 2016. The estimation sample used
in this paper contains 3,072,903 finishing times from 7,123 different runs of distance 5k(kilometer),
10k, 15k, 10 miles (16.090k), half marathon/21k or marathon. The official marathon length is 42.195
kilometer (26.2-mile) and the official half marathon length is 21.1k. In our data, we classify all runs
with a length of 21k to 21.1k as half marathons, just as we classify all runs with a length of 16k to 16.1k as
9
10 mile runs.11 With regard to finishing time, a distinction can be made between a runner’s clock time
(the time between the start of the race till the runner passes the finishing line) and his/her chip time
(the time between the runner passing the starting and finishing line). Following Allen et al. (2017), we
will throughout use chip-time whenever available; in cases where we have only a single finishing time,
we will treat is as if it were a chip time.12
3.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 1 shows the number of unique finishing times for each distance. As the table shows, with over 1
million observations, the 10k distance is the distance most frequently run, followed by the 5k and half
marathon distance. The remaining distances are less commonly observed but still have over 150,000
finishing times. Next to the finishing time, our data also includes relevant background variables on the
runner, such as the runner’s gender, year-of birth, and the reported association of the runner.13 The
latter variable is either the name of the village in which the runner resides or the name of the athletics
club of which the runner is a member. We use this as an indicator of whether an individual runs alone
or as part of team and investigate whether being part of a club influences goal-setting.14 Table 2 pro-
vides details on these variables for each distance category. We observe that the average age is increasing
in distance with the most notable jump between 5k and 10k. We find a similar effect for gender: the
majority of runners who completes 5k is female (55%) but this balance decisively tilts towards males
for the 10k (only 37% females), and this trend continues in the half marathon andmarathon, in which
the percentage of female participants is 33% and 17%, respectively.
11The complete data set contains 5,321,614 finishing times, from 10,703 different events. A considerable number of runs
are “street runs” without a specified distance (983,678 records) or non-major distances (1,212,988 records). Details on the
data collection, the way the data has been organized and details on the composition of the estimation sample can be found
in Online Appendix A.
12The chip time technology has been adopted quickly. For the races before the year 2000, chip time is not available;
from the year 2003 onwards, the majority of finishing times in our data are chip times.
13To identify a runner’s gender, we matched the first given name of each observation with a data base of the 10,000
most common given names in the Netherlands. This data base contains all given names that have been given 27 times
or more to children born in the Netherlands in the time period 1983-2006 according to the administrative records of the
Sociale Verzekeringsbank. In case of a match, the result can be that the runner is classified as a male, female or ambiguous
(some names like “Anne” are used for boys and girls). In case of nomatch, the second and third given names are considered
to identify the gender. In total, in 4,797,905 cases the gender of the runner is determined (2,920,426 male observations;
1,499,673 female and 377,806 ambiguous).
14In contrast to Allen et al. (2017), our data does not contain split times; unlike Markle et al. (forthcoming) we do not
have survey evidence on runners’ time goals.
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Table 1: By distance summary of unique finishing times








We utilize the fact that our data includes personal identifiers such as name, birth year and place
of residence. This information enables us to link finishing times of the same individual and thereby
to reconstruct individual running careers. As runners need to fill in their personal details every time
they sign up for a run (there is no central registry), it happpens that the same individual is registered
under different names, dependent onwhether the full name or only one ormore initials are used (“jan
jansen”; “j jansen”, “j m jansen”) or simple spelling mistakes (“jan janssen”, “jan janse”). We address
this by considering the similarity of the given and family name of different observations using the Jaro-
Winkler distancemetric (Winkler, 1999). The Jaro-Winkler distance has been developed specifically to
detect duplicates in record linkage that result from typo’s. The Jaro-Winkler distance metric returns a
value between 0 and 1. A score of 0 means an exact match and a score of 1 implies no similarity. One
feature of the Jaro-Winkler distance metric is that the substitution of two characters that are close is
considered less important than the substitution of two characters further apart. We use a threshold
value of 0.15 with all pairs of names being considered duplicates if the Jaro-Winkler score on both the
given and family name was smaller or equal to 0.15. A summary of the number of runs per unique
runner when the (unbalanced) panel is constructed in this manner is given in Table 3. As the table
shows, the majority of runners (57%) participates only once. About 5% of all runners are frequent
runners with more than ten finishing times in the data base for the distances considered.
Having identified for each unique runner a sequence of finishing times and distances run, we can
answer more precisely the question how the wedge between male and female participation grows for
longer distances: Is this because – compared to men – less females start to run at later ages or because
less females continue to run and make the transition to longer distances? What is the chance that the
11
Table 2: Summary Statistics Distances
mean sd p10 p90
10k
Age 41.64 11.70 26 57
Gender 0.626 0.484 0 1
Speed 11.75 2.058 9.377 14.54
Club 0.139 0.346 0 1
10m
Age 43.18 10.62 29 57
Gender 0.747 0.435 0 1
Speed 11.85 1.862 9.705 14.27
Club 0.170 0.375 0 1
15k
Age 43.36 10.70 29 57
Gender 0.738 0.440 0 1
Speed 11.88 1.863 9.695 14.35
Club 0.171 0.377 0 1
5k
Age 35.47 14.46 15 54
Gender 0.455 0.498 0 1
Speed 11.10 2.354 8.483 14.48
Club 0.111 0.314 0 1
half
Age 43.38 10.42 29 57
Gender 0.672 0.469 0 1
Speed 11.62 1.742 9.591 13.87
Club 0.166 0.372 0 1
marathon
Age 43.07 9.761 30 56
Gender 0.830 0.376 0 1
Speed 10.98 1.767 8.928 13.27
Club 0.159 0.366 0 1
Total
Age 40.83 12.34 24 56
Gender 0.623 0.485 0 1
Speed 11.55 2.063 9.155 14.31
Club 0.143 0.350 0 1
N 3072309
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Table 3: Summary: Number of runs per unique runner.
no. runs no. runners percent cum. perc.
1 583,313 57.6 57.6
2 159,171 15.7 73.3
3 77,798 7.7 80.9
4 46,020 4.5 85.5
5 30,099 3.0 88.5
6 21,420 2.1 90.6
7 15,959 1.6 92.1
8 12,005 1.2 93.3
9 9,611 0.9 94.3
10 7,637 0.8 95.0
>10 50,365 5.0 100.0
Total 1,013,398
Note: The five most active runners completed 268, 285, 309, 396 and
534 runs, respectively.
next run of an individual who currently runs a distance ` is a run with length `′ > `? Table 4 depicts
this transitionmatrix based on our data. A look at the table by column shows that when a runner par-
ticipates in a run of length `, most likely the previous run in which the runner participated was also
of length `. This holds for males and females alike.15 However, a row-wise comparison between males
and females reveals interesting differences. For every distance, the likelihood to quit after completion is
considerably higher for women than formen. The differences, summarized in percentage point differ-
ences at the bottomof the table, indicate that a higher percentage ofmales increases the distance of the
next run and that females, conditional of having completed a run of length `, are 6 up to 11 percentage
points more likely to quit running. Put another way, when one observes a female participating in a
10k or 21k run, chances are 29 to 33% that this is her final run; for males the corresponding numbers
are 20 and 24%.
15For example, in 32.7% of all cases the previous run of a man who runs 21k has also been a 21k run.
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Table 4: Matrix of conditional transition probabilities.
Next distance (Distancen+1)
Distancen 5k 10k 15k 10 mile 21k marathon none
MALES
5k 0.392 0.180 0.021 0.017 0.036 0.005 0.349
10k 0.071 0.447 0.060 0.048 0.120 0.019 0.235
15k 0.042 0.246 0.187 0.067 0.228 0.048 0.182
10m 0.040 0.242 0.089 0.177 0.216 0.035 0.201
half 0.032 0.226 0.072 0.066 0.328 0.078 0.198
marathon 0.022 0.134 0.063 0.037 0.192 0.176 0.376
FEMALES
5k 0.351 0.150 0.012 0.008 0.019 0.002 0.459
10k 0.104 0.402 0.049 0.029 0.082 0.009 0.327
15k 0.061 0.258 0.135 0.049 0.214 0.035 0.248
10m 0.060 0.232 0.067 0.137 0.212 0.022 0.269
half 0.049 0.223 0.062 0.050 0.270 0.053 0.292
marathon 0.039 0.148 0.057 0.032 0.177 0.110 0.437
Difference males vs. females
5k 0.041 0.030 0.009 0.009 0.017 0.004 -0.110
10k -0.033 0.045 0.012 0.019 0.039 0.010 -0.091
15k -0.019 -0.012 0.052 0.017 0.014 0.013 -0.065
10m -0.020 0.010 0.022 0.040 0.004 0.012 -0.068
half -0.018 0.004 0.010 0.016 0.057 0.025 -0.094
marathon -0.017 -0.014 0.006 0.005 0.015 0.066 -0.061
The last finishing time in our data of active runners is by construction 2016. To avoid that these records are interpreted as the
final run in the career of these runners, we limited attention in constructing this table to pairs of runs (n, n + 1) for which
finishing time nwas recorded before 2016.
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4 Empirical results
Our empirical analysis consists of three parts. First, we consider the aggregate distribution of finish-
ing times per distance to see whether there are indications of excess mass just before the 10-minute
marks. Second, having established excess mass for all distances, we then peer deeper into the origins of
bunching behavior. Is there a relation between the propensity to bunch just before 10-minute marks
and runner and race characteristics, such as age, gender and distance? Third, the predictive power of
bunching is assessed: Are individuals who bunch more likely to shift to running longer distances? If
so, their bunching behavior (short-term goal setting) may originate from a longer-run objective they
have in mind but is unobserved by the researcher.
4.1 Bunching of finishing times
As a first step towards identifying whether a correlation exists between short-run goals and long-run
objectives, we investigate whether there exists an excess mass just before round numbers are observed
for different distances. We closely follow Allen et al (2017) in using the non-parametric excess mass
test developed by Chetty (2011).
The Chetty(2011) methodology suggests the following steps: First, we define the round finishing
times (reference points) around which we expect bunching, then we estimate a counterfactual distri-
bution while excluding the observations in the bunching region. The difference between the actual
and counterfactual distribution in the bunching region is the measure of excess mass. The counter-
factual distribution is obtained by fitting a quintic polynomial to the distribution around the round
number by excluding the bunching period. There are several parameters of consideration in the fol-
lowing procedure: the reference time, the bunching region, the analysed interval of distribution for
the quintic regression and the size of the bin in the distribution. To keep our analysis comparable to
Allen et al. (2017) we choose a 4m bunching region and a 16m analysed interval (8m before and 8m af-
ter the round time) for themarathon and half of these values for the half-marathon. The choice of bin
size depends on data availability. We benefit from having a large number of observations per finishing
time. This allows us to reduce the bin size while keeping a substantial number of finishing times per
each bin. The bin size in our analysis is 15 seconds as in Allen et al. (2017). For consistency, we use for
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the shorter 10 mile, 15k, 10k and 5k runs the same parameters as for the half-marathon. Figure 2 shows
the distribution of finishing times for the 21k and marathon around some selected 10 minute points
and Figure 3 does the same for 5 and 10k runs. 16
For the marathon, we observe a clear excess mass just before the 3h00m, 3h30m, 4h00m and (to
a lesser extent) 4h30m. For the half marathon, a similar kink in the distribution shows before the
1h30m and 2h00m finishing time. For the half marathon, bunching is less pronounced than for the
marathon, despite the number of observations being higher.
Turning attention to the bunching region, Table 5 presentd the actual and estimated number of
finishers before the reference time. We also report t-statistics of the estimated values obtained by boot-
strapping with 1,000 iterations. In all reported distances and reference times (except for the 5k 30
minute reference) we observe significant excess mass of finishers. The highest value of excess mass of
32.9% is observed for the 3 hour finishing time in the marathon. Allen et al. (2017) report the highest
excess mass for the same time with a value of 24.2%. The second and third highest excess mass values
(4h and 3h30mpoints) also coincidewith the analysis inAllen et al. (2017). Table 5 confirms the graph-
ical evidence that even though the number of finishers is the the highest for the 10k run, relativelymore
bunching is observed in the marathon.
In sum, the evidence in this section adds to the earlier evidence provided by Allen et al. (2017) that
runners do set time goals and thus do attach weight (η > 0) to comparison utility that depends on a
reference point.
4.2 Bunching and personal traits
Whereas the previous section showed that bunching just before 10-minute intervals is observed in
runs of all distances, the next question of interest is whether we can say more about the origins of
bunching: which people bunch and does this depend on their past performance or objectives for the
future? Herewemakeuse of the circumstance that our data envelopes large part of theuniverse of runs
held in the Netherlands, which enables us to track runners over time. We not only observe important
personal characteristics of a runner such as age and gender but also the runner’s history, the cumulative
16Figures A1-A3 in the Online Appendix show the results for all 10 minutes between the 10th and 90th percentile fin-
ishing time.
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(a) Marathon 3h00m. (b) Marathon 3h30m.
(c) Marathon 4h00m. (d) Marathon 4h30m.
(e) Half marathon 1h30m. (f) Half marathon 2h00m.
Figure 2: Distribution of the number of finishing times around a round number and the fitted coun-
terfactual distribution.
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(a) 10m 1h00m. (b) 15k 1h00m.
(c) 10k 0m40. (d) 10k 0h50m.
(e) 5k 0h20m. (f) 5k 0h30m.
Figure 3: Distribution of the number of finishing times around a round number and the fitted coun-
terfactual distribution.
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Table 5: Chetty et al. (2011) test for selected round times.
Distance Round Actual Counterfactual % excess t-
time finishers finishers finishers statistic
5k 0:20 41121 39936 2.97 4.41
0:30 113563 112872 0.61 1.58
10k 0:40 43266 41424 4.45 6.66
0:50 116606 113074 3.12 7.76
15k 1:00 5396 4897 10.19 5.00
10m 1:00 2064 1868 10.47 3.16
21k 1:30 13823 12638 9.38 8.16
2:00 29445 28328 3.94 5.21
marathon 3:00 2870 2159 32.92 12.03
3:30 6701 5800 15.53 9.71
4:00 9542 8154 17.02 12.20
4:30 5221 4734 10.28 5.41
Note: t-statistics are obtained usingR = 1, 000 bootstrap samples.
distance run so far, and whether or not the runner participates as a member of an athletics club. By
considering the possible relation between bunching behavior and these variables, we hope to get closer
to answering the question: Do runners finish just before a round time because they evaluate runs in
isolation and set a reference time for each run separately, or do they set these short term goals in light
of longer-run objectives? To that end, we estimate for each distance separately the following linear
probability model:
P (Bunchit = 1) = Xitβ + it, (3)
withBunchit a dummy variable with value 1 if runner i bunches in run t and 0 otherwise. As before,
bunching is defined as finishing within 75-seconds before a 10-minute round time. The vectorXit is a
set of time-variant and time-invariant explanatory variables including a gender dummy, age category
and the cumulative distance (and cumulative distance squared) run by runner i. The age categories
used are: 5-25[years], 26-35, 36-40, 41-45, 46-50, 51-59, 60-85.17
Table 6 presents the results of these regressions. The smallR2 values are due to our definition of
17We have chosen these specific categories because they lead to about equally sized bins. To prevent outliers to drive the
results, we follow the common practice to winsorize the data by taking out - per distance - the finishing times below the
1th percentile and above the 99th percentile.
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bunching; a great deal of noise is involved when a runner finishes within the 75-second interval before
a 10-minute time. Runners without any goal in mind will end up in this interval 12.5% (= 75/600) of
the time and runners with a 10-minute goal in mind will often end up outside this interval because of
insufficient control over their race.
A first insight from the table is that the estimate of the gender coefficient changes across runs:
for the 5k distance, females seem to bunch significantly more than males. For the longer distances
however, this is consistently reversed with men being up to 0.5 percentage point more likely to bunch
than women. This seems at odds with the idea that runners bunch because of longer-run objectives.
After all, if this is the reason tobunch, onewould expect higher 5k bunching amongmales because they
more often continue with longer distances. For more conclusive evidence on this, we need however to
look into the individual careers of the bunching males and females, which we do in the next section.18
In line with the idea that runners bunch because of long-term objectives is the fact that especially
for the shorter distance runs (5k and 10k) we observe that younger runners tend to bunch more than
older runners. For runs longer than 10k, no correlation between age and the propensity to bunch can
be detected. The table further shows that the relation between bunching and the cumulative distance
run is that of an inverted U-shape, with the upward sloping part being the relevant part of the curve.
In other words: the propensity to bunch increases with the cumulative number of kilometers run.
Cumulative distance run can be considered a proxy for running experience. If bunchingwould be just
a non-rational “anomaly”, field experimental evidence (List, 2003) suggests that bunching, if anything,
declines with experience. Allen et al. (2017) do not find a clear relation between experience (in their
case measured as the number of marathons) and bunching behavior.
4.3 Bunching and longer-distance run participation
Wenow turn to the questionwhether bunching or goal-setting in shorter distance runs predicts future
participation in longer-distance runs. Consider an individual i who has completed a total of T runs,
18It may be tempting to relate these gender differences in bunching to the literature on gender and competition
(Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007) which shows that women are more likely to shy away from competition. However, al-
though bunching is indicative of competing against a self-set goal, there is no obvious connection with interpersonal com-
petition. In this regard, note that the coefficient for the contest-dummy does not show a clear pattern across the columns
in Table 6.
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Table 6: Personal traits related to bunching
5k 10k 15k 10m 21k 42k
female 0.0024∗ 0.0000 -0.0047∗∗ -0.0056∗∗ -0.0032∗∗ -0.0046∗
(0.0012) (0.0008) (0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0011) (0.0023)
age 26-35 0.0069∗∗∗ 0.0022 -0.0022 0.0013 -0.0020 0.0088
(0.0016) (0.0014) (0.0038) (0.0042) (0.0024) (0.0051)
age 36-40 0.0087∗∗∗ 0.0061∗∗∗ -0.0019 -0.0019 -0.0005 0.0029
(0.0019) (0.0015) (0.0039) (0.0043) (0.0024) (0.0052)
age 41-45 0.0030 0.0041∗∗ 0.0001 -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0010
(0.0018) (0.0015) (0.0038) (0.0042) (0.0024) (0.0050)
age 46-50 -0.0048∗ 0.0032∗ 0.0009 -0.0023 -0.0005 0.0012
(0.0019) (0.0015) (0.0039) (0.0042) (0.0024) (0.0051)
age 51-59 -0.0099∗∗∗ 0.0025 -0.0025 -0.0028 -0.0015 -0.0007
(0.0021) (0.0015) (0.0039) (0.0043) (0.0024) (0.0051)
age 60-85 -0.0220∗∗∗ 0.0009 -0.0087 -0.0104∗ -0.0028 -0.0001
(0.0034) (0.0021) (0.0047) (0.0051) (0.0029) (0.0063)
CLUB 0.0146∗∗∗ -0.0004 0.0015 -0.0012 0.0029∗ -0.0033
(0.0021) (0.0013) (0.0021) (0.0023) (0.0013) (0.0025)
CONTEST 0.0092 0.0055∗∗ 0.0038 0.0073 0.0021 -0.0069
(0.0047) (0.0020) (0.0031) (0.0040) (0.0029) (0.0096)
cumdist 0.0001∗∗∗ 0.0000∗ 0.0000 0.0000∗ 0.0000∗∗ 0.0000∗
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
cumdist2 -0.0000∗∗∗ -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000∗∗ -0.0000∗
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Constant 0.1322∗∗∗ 0.1288∗∗∗ 0.1323∗∗∗ 0.1321∗∗∗ 0.1332∗∗∗ 0.1335∗∗∗
(0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0034) (0.0038) (0.0022) (0.0047)
Observations 710960 1180385 213604 187983 554852 154108
R2 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗(∗∗,∗ ) : statistically different from zero at the 0.1%-level (1%-level, 5%-level).
Dummy variables for missing age and gender included. Age bracket [5, 25] benchmark category. Errors clustered at the runner level.
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with the sequence of distances run given by di1, di2, . . . , diT . Let dmaxit denote themaximumdistance
that individual i has run up to and including run t. Our interest is in the probability that an individual
will participate in a longer distance run than he or she has done so far. That is, for any given t forwhich
dmaxit = y, what is the probability that there exists a t′ ∈ (t, T ] such that dmaxit′ = y′ > y?
runner A
runner B
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10time
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10time
distance 5k 5k 10k 5k 10k 10k 5k 21k 10k
distance 5k 5k 21k 10k 5k 21k 10k 42k 10k 5k
IA IIA IIIA
IB IIB
Figure 4: Careers of two runners A and B.
To illustrate the procedure we follow to establish whether bunching is related to future partici-
pation in longer races, Figure 4 presents the running careers of two runners, A and B. Runner A
has participated in a total of nine runs, runner B in ten. The maximum distance run by runner A is
21k, the maximum distance run by runner B is 42k. If – conditional on having completed a 21k run
— bunching and future participation in a 42k run are positively correlated, we should find a higher
frequency of bunching by runner B in runs IIB than by runner A in runs IIIA. To test this, we will
estimate the following logistic regression:
P (dmaxit′ = 42, for some t
′ > t|dmaxit = 21) = γBunchit + Zitδ + uit,
i = 1, . . . , N ; t ∈ {t : dmaxit = 21}, (4)
with the dependent variable theprobability that runner i conditional onhaving a 21k run as the longest
completed distance, will participate in amarathon at least once. With some abuse of notation, we will
write the probability on the left hand side asP (21→ 42). The vectorZ contains other variables that
may influence whether a runner shifts to longer distances. This includes all variables included inX
in Section 4.2 but also running speed because low-speed runners are less likely to transfer to higher
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distances.
In our estimations, we will not limit attention to the 21k to 42k transition probability, but also
P (5→ 10) and P (10→ 21) probabilities.19 Returning to our example, we would use observations
IA and IB in estimating (4) forP (5→ 10), and observations IIA to estimate (4) forP (10→ 21).20
As a test of the theoretical prediction that reference dependence attenuates impulsiveness, we estimate
(4) separately for men and women and interact the bunching-dummy with the age categories. The
finding that impulsiveness is decreasingwith age (Eysenck et al., 1985), suggests that bunchingbehavior
as a goal-setting device may especially help younger people to obtain their long run objective. In that
case, we should find that γ is higher for young runners. The disturbances uit will be clustered at the
runner-level.
Before presenting the results we would like to make a number of comments. First, the way we
define estimation samples IA, IIA etc. is of course highly endogenous: the time at which the longer
distance is run for the first time determines the final observation in the estimation sample. One should
for this reason not take our estimates as an unbiased estimate of the true probability. However, for
our more benign purposes this is not problematic since our interest is in the possible correlation be-
tween bunching in shorter distances and participation in longer distances. Second, whereas the above
regression equation enables us to study the correlation between bunching and future participation in
longer-distance runs, our data has an important limitation that disallows us to establish causality. This
limitation is that we only observe a runner’s finishing time and participation decision, not the actual
short and long-term targets that a runner actually sets. In other words, for runners that finish outside
a bunching interval, we do not know whether they missed their target or whether they did not have a
target. The theory presented predicts that people finish at round times because they have longer-run
objectives. The reverse however also is a possibility: that runners who manage to meet self-imposed
targets are more likely to move to longer distances. Yet another possibility is that the correlation be-
tween bunching and participation in longer distance runs is driven by an unobserved third variable,
e.g. self-control, that influences both people’s capability to set and reach targets as well as their taste to
19In this section, we ignore the less common 15k and 10mile runs.
20Note that based on the information of these two runners alone, neither the impact of bunching on P (5 → 10) or
P (10→ 21) can be identified because both runners transfer to 10 and 21k runs.
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run marathons.
Table 7 presents the regression estimates of equation (4). Lets focus on column (2) which shows
how various variables are correlated with the probability to engage in a 21k run in the future for men,
conditional on the current maximum distance being 10k. Not surprisingly, we observe that runners
who are a member of an athletics club transfer to a higher distance with a much higher likelihood.
This generally holds for all distance transitions and for males and female alike. In part this reflects a
selection effect – runners who subscribe to an athletics club will on average have higher ambitions in
running – but to some extent this may also originate from the discipline that a club and team mates
provide. Another general finding is that there is a positive correlation between transferring to a higher
distance and running experience (measured by the cumulative kilometers run), speed, and the current
runs being 10k runs (the benchmark category being 5k runs). With regard to age, we see that for both
sexes the probability of participating in higher distance runs is increasing until an age of about 36 to
45 years but is decreasing afterwards. Men aged over 60 who have never run more than 10 or 21k, are
less likely to do so in the future than runners aged between 5 to 25. The same holds for women when
aged over 50.
The table also shows that for none of the distances bunching is a good predictor of future par-
ticipation in longer distance runs. In other words, runners do bunch but apparently not because of
long-run objectives they have in mind. However, this aggregate bunching coefficient does not allow
for treatment heterogeneity. If it is true that, as theory suggests, bunching is in particular an effective
goal-setting device for the young and impulsive, we would expect the correlation between bunching
and participation in longer distance runs to be higher for younger runners. Therefore, we have also in-
teracted the bunching dummy with the age categories, Figure 5 depicts the marginal effects. For none
of the sexes or distance transitions, there is an indication that younger runners who bunch are more
likely to continue running longer distances than their non-bunching peers. This leads us to conclude
that there is no evidence that individuals finish just before a 10-minute time because they aremotivated
by the objective to participate in longer runs in the future.
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Table 7: Logit estimates future longer distance participation
Males Females
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. var P (5→ 10) P (10→ 21) P (21→ 42) P (5→ 10) P (10→ 21) P (21→ 42)
Bunch 0.034 0.020 0.004 0.020 -0.004 0.033
(0.021) (0.013) (0.012) (0.016) (0.017) (0.021)
age 26-35 0.871∗∗∗ 0.562∗∗∗ 0.355∗∗∗ 0.664∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗ 0.013
(0.028) (0.029) (0.051) (0.023) (0.033) (0.083)
age 36-40 1.201∗∗∗ 0.806∗∗∗ 0.561∗∗∗ 0.813∗∗∗ 0.333∗∗∗ 0.254∗∗
(0.034) (0.031) (0.054) (0.026) (0.036) (0.085)
age 41-45 1.147∗∗∗ 0.827∗∗∗ 0.516∗∗∗ 0.791∗∗∗ 0.363∗∗∗ 0.193∗
(0.033) (0.031) (0.054) (0.027) (0.036) (0.085)
age 46-50 1.093∗∗∗ 0.673∗∗∗ 0.348∗∗∗ 0.665∗∗∗ 0.238∗∗∗ 0.029
(0.037) (0.033) (0.055) (0.032) (0.040) (0.088)
age 51-59 0.869∗∗∗ 0.396∗∗∗ 0.008 0.513∗∗∗ -0.132∗∗ -0.459∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.035) (0.059) (0.039) (0.050) (0.100)
age 60-85 0.416∗∗∗ -0.132∗ -0.703∗∗∗ -0.224∗ -0.802∗∗∗ -1.312∗∗∗
(0.069) (0.058) (0.092) (0.112) (0.115) (0.191)
CLUB 0.318∗∗∗ 0.558∗∗∗ 0.460∗∗∗ 0.306∗∗∗ 0.600∗∗∗ 0.465∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.029) (0.036) (0.034) (0.035) (0.054)
CONTEST -0.625∗∗∗ -0.168∗∗∗ 0.231∗∗∗ -0.485∗∗∗ -0.063 0.277∗∗∗
(0.070) (0.032) (0.032) (0.066) (0.046) (0.060)
cumdist 0.017∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ -0.000 0.013∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.004∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
cumdist2 -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗ -0.000 -0.000 -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Speed 0.296∗∗∗ 1.053∗∗∗ 0.971∗∗∗ 1.159∗∗∗ 1.887∗∗∗ 1.422∗∗∗
(0.046) (0.050) (0.075) (0.062) (0.086) (0.150)
Speed2 -0.004 -0.033∗∗∗ -0.031∗∗∗ -0.041∗∗∗ -0.070∗∗∗ -0.052∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.007)
Distance:
10 0.498∗∗∗ 0.516∗∗∗ 0.512∗∗∗ 0.470∗∗∗







Constant -4.977∗∗∗ -10.154∗∗∗ -9.835∗∗∗ -9.430∗∗∗ -14.602∗∗∗ -12.135∗∗∗
(0.278) (0.310) (0.458) (0.319) (0.474) (0.854)
obs. 191,082 418,830 659,406 256,684 310,350 217,357
pseudoR2 0.062 0.047 0.053 0.048 0.054 0.052
Standard errors in parentheses; ∗∗∗(∗∗,∗ ) : statistically different from zero at the 0.1%-level (1%-level, 5%-level).
Benchmark categories: age 5-25; VILLAGE; RECREATIVE; Distance=5k. Errors clustered at the runner level.
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(a) Males: P (5→ 10). (b) Females: P (5→ 10).
(c) Males: P (10→ 21). (d) Females: P (10→ 21).
(e) Males: P (21→ 42). (f) Females: P (21→ 42).
Figure 5: Marginal effect of bunching on participation in longer distances
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5 Summary
In this paper, we consider the prevalence of reference points in sport activities using a new data set
covering organized runs of different distances in theNetherlands in the period 1996-2016. In line with
other recent studies we find excess mass just before the 10-minute round times for the marathon, but
also for the shorter 5k, 10k and 21k runs. This indicates that a non-negligible sub-sample of runners
sets themselves a round time-goal in individual runs. The questionwhatmotivates runners to set such
timegoals has howevernot yet been answered. Guidedby recent theoryongoal-setting,we explore one
potential motivation for bunching behavior: short-term goals help people to overcome self-control
problems and thereby to reach more distant objectives. Translated to our running context, this may
imply that runners who bunch are more likely to participate in longer distance runs in the future. We
empirically test this hypothesis but donot find any evidence. Runnerswho finish at a round time goals
are not anymore likely to switch to longer distances than others. This negative result continues to hold
if we zoom in on the younger runners, who allegedly aremore impulsive and thus would benefit more
from goal-setting. In sum, our empirical evidence does not support the hypothesis that the bunching
observed in our data ismotivated by the presence of longer-run objectives. More research on this topic
using innovative designs is welcomed.
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Online Appendix
A Data Set Construction
The data were retrieved from the web site www.uitslagen.nl, an public online data base were or-
ganizers of running events in the Netherlands can post results. All posted results, 6,544,393 in total,
were downloaded at September 1, 2016. The data contain the following variables:
name: Name of runner, given name and family name;
wnplsver: Village or affiliation (team or school) runner;
birthyr: Year of birth;
bruto: Gross time;
netto: Net time;
event: Name of running event;
locationdate: Location and date of the running event;
type: Running subcategory in which runner participated (gender, distance);
place: Place in ranking of runner within the subcategory.
All observations without information on ‘name’, ‘wnplsver’ and ‘birthyr’ have been discarded
(1,206,499 observations in total). Also the observations that mentioned ‘starting number’ or ‘munic-
ipality’ as name (8,332 and 333 observations) have been discarded. Then there were names consisting
of numbers (e.g. “03 01 2006 19:41”). We kept these observations (3,196 in total) in our initial sample
but constructed a variable “individu” which received the value ”NOIDVLNAME” (meaning: indi-
vidual cannot be identified by listed name) for these observations.21 The variable individu receives
the value FIRM if the name contains a company name such as ‘shell’, ‘aramco’, ‘rabobank’ etc.
21Other observations that received the valueNOIDVLNAME for the variable individu are records without name (18
cases), and records of which name starts or ends with a number, the name starts with a special character or has the phrase
”av”, ”team” or ”athletics” in it. These are about 6,000 cases in total.
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A.1 Runner identification
Based on the above variables, a number of identifying keys have been constructed:
idxEVENT An event identifier;
idxEVENTsubcat An identifier for the subcategory of the event;
idxRUNNERinitial A runner-specific ID based on the name and birth year information before the
data manipulations described below;
idxRUNNER A runner-specific ID based on the information aer the datamanipulations described
below.
To start, all uniquenameandbirthyear combinations are given their own identifying ID,idxRUNNERinitial.
This implies that individuals with the same name but a different or missing birth year get assigned a
different ID. For this reason, the number of distinct initial IDs (1,855,081) is an upper bound for the
number of unique runners in the data set.
However, absent a central registry, runners need to fill in their personal details every time they sign
up for a run. This implies that the same individual often is registeredunder differentnames, dependent
on whether the full name or only one or more initials are used (“jan jansen”; “j jansen”, “j m jansen”)
or simple spellingmistakes (“jan janssen”, “jan janse”). The same holds for the place of residence. The
same runner may appear with different places of residence just because he or she has moved but a
runner may also participate in some runs bymentioning his/her home address (”Amsterdam”) and in
others the athletics club (“Hellas”) or school (“University of Groningen”) to which (s)he is affiliated.
Typo’s may also lead to different entries for the same individual (“1947” and “1974”).
These issues were dealt with in the following way. The observations were sorted on year of birth,
village or affiliation (in that particular order) and then the similarity of the given and family name
of each two subsequent observations was measured using the Jaro-Winkler distance (Winkler, 1999).
The Jaro-Winkler distance has been developed specifically to detect duplicates in record linkage that
result from typo’s. The Jaro-Winkler distance metric returns a value between 0 and 1. A score of 0
means an exact match and a score of 1 implies no similarity. One feature of the Jaro-Winkler distance
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metric is that the substitution of two characters that are close are considered less important than the
substitution of two characters further apart.
We use a threshold value of 0.15 with all pairs of names being considered duplicates if the Jaro-
Winkler score on both the given and family name was smaller or equal to 0.15. This rule however does
not detect as duplicates two names that differ in the given name because in one case more initials are
recorded than in the other. To account for this, two pairs of names are also considered duplicates if
the first given name or initial is exactly identical and the Jaro-Winkler score for the family name is 0.10
or less.
For a considerable number of running events, the year of birth is not recorded. We decided to
identify two individuals as the same personwhen they are the two unique individuals who share name
and place of residence, but for one of them the year of birth is missing.
Two individualswho share a unique namebut notwnplsver are considered the sameperson only
if there are no other individuals with the same name and if they have the same year of birth or the year
of birth of one of the two is missing. This to some extent accounts for the fact that a large group of
runners participates under different affiliations, e.g. their place of residence and their athletics club.
Given the many different names and birth years under which individuals appear, this procedure
overstates the number of different runners.22 We chose a conservative approach because the opposite
– grouping results of different individuals as if they are the same person – is worse.
A.2 Identification of gender
To identify a runner’s gender, we matched the first given name of each observation with a data base
of the 10,000 most common given names in the Netherlands.23 In case of a match, the result can be
that the runner is classified as a male, female or ambiguous (some names like “Anne” are used for boys
and girls). In case of nomatch, the second and third given name are considered to identify the gender.
In total, in 4,797,905 cases the gender of the runner can be determined (2,920,426 male observations;
22e.g. (egbert hogerweij sisu 1944; egbert hogerwey sisu 1944) is considered a different individual than (egbert hogerweij
almelo 1945; egbert hogerwey almelo 1945; egbert hogerwey almelo) and (egbert hogerweij amersfoortse verzeke). Probably
it is the same person but they are counted as three different individuals.
23This data set was downloaded from http://www.naamkunde.net/?page_id=293 on July 14, 2017. This data
base contains all given names that have been given 27 times ormore to children born in theNetherlands in the time period
1983-2006 according to the administrative records of the Sociale Verzekeringsbank.
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1,499,673 female and 377,806 ambiguous). Note that this identification method only uses name in-
formation from single runs. Considering all runs by a single individual further improves the gender
identification (for example, “c kruit” will be classified as ambiguous but when it turns out that this
person participated under the name “chantal kruit” in other runs, she can be classified as female). An-
other source of information is the name of the subcategory in which the individual participated. For
example, when this name is “10k run ladies 30-45y” we know that the individual is a female. To es-
tablish the ‘final’ gender of a runner, we combine name information (across runs) and subcategory
information. This procedure leaves 59,912 runners unclassified in terms of gender.
A.3 Identification of birth year
Years of birth before 1900 were set to missing, just as years beyond 2016. When only the final two or
three digits of a year were mentioned, this number was completed to four digits. Cases where the year
of birth entry contained non-numerical characters were set to missing.
A.4 Identification of affiliation
Based on the variable wnplsver a variable ‘affiliatie’ is constructed which says whether has
filled out his village, province, club or school affiliation on the form. The variable assigns the value
“CLUB” if there is a match with one of the names of athletic clubs in the Netherlands24 or when
wnplsver contains the oneof thewords “av”, “loopgroep”, “loopteam”, “atletiek”, “atletics” or “run-
ners”. affiliatie=VILLAGE if there is amatchwith one of the official village names in theNether-
lands.25 Other values for affiliatie are PRIMSCHOOL (for primary schools, abbreviations ”cbs”,
”obs” ”rkbs” etc.), SEC school (secondary school), UNIVERSITY, PROVINCE (for each of the twelve
Dutch provinces), NEDERLANDandNONE (if wnplsver is blank). In this way, a total of 1,395,597
can be assigned a value for affiliatie: VILLAGE (1,040,792), CLUB (183,597), NONE (133,568),
SECSCHOOL (14,961), NEDERLAND (11,135), PRIMSCHOOL (10,715) and PROVINCE (116).
24The list of names of these clubs was taken from the web site https://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lijst_van_
Nederlandse_atletiekverenigingen, visited July 24, 2017.
25This list was obtained from https://home.kpn.nl/pagklein/almanak.html, visited July 20, 2017.
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A.5 Identification of distances
The variable type contains the information on the distance that is run. For example, “M40, 10KILO-
METER” says that the runner participated in a runover 10 kilometer formen aged40 and above. Some
care had to be taken because, dependent on the context, “10m” may mean 10 miles, 10 meter or men
aged 10 and above. There are multiple ways to denote a distance, with a half marathon for example
being written as “halve marathon”, “21.1km”, “hm” and “hmtn”. For a total of 110,526 subcategories
of events (out of 141,168), the distance has been determined based on the information in type. Of
the events without a distance, 264 events concerned a Cooper test where participants run a fixed time
instead of a fixed distance, 476 a relay race.
A.6 Recreational and competitive runs
Runs can be competitive or recreative and it is common to organize a competition within a run for
a selected number of athletes. For example, the first runners that start in a marathon often are (semi-
)professionals who receive money to participate. They compete to win a prize and/or to set a new
track record. They are then followed by the recreational athletes. Based on the information retrieved
from the type variable, a variable Contest has been constructed that takes on the following values:
CONTEST if the runner is in a competition; KIDS/YOUTH/STUDENT if the run is classified a
so-called ‘kids run’, ‘youth run’ or ‘student run’; SCHOOL if the run is organized by school(s), and
RECREATIVE if no formal contest element is present. A total of 22,330 runs receive on of these
qualifications.
A.7 Estimation sample
The file RunRecordsFINAL.dta contains 5,321,614 unique running results participating in a total of
10,703 events (based on idxEVENT). In 19,261 cases, no finishing time is provided. Another 983,678
records have no distance attached to them, these are observations from street runs of unspecified
length. Of the finishing times with a distance attached, 1,218,817 concern finishing times for runs other
than the 5k, 10k, 15k, 10m, half marathon or marathon distance that are the object of our analysis. We
also discard 11,635 observations (< 1%) because the implicit average speed excees that of the world
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record at that particular distance. Finally, we discard all finishing times by individuals with a recorded
age lower than five or higher than 95 (1,254 observations in total < 0.1%). This leaves us with an
estimation sample of 3,086,969 finishing times for 1,020,629 unique runners participating in a total
of 7,159 different events, see Table A1. For the part of the analysis that uses the panel property of our
data, we leave out 2,034 “non-individual” results. These finishing times have been set by people who
participated for example as employee of a firm and appear in the data as, for example “ING team 1”.
Table A1: From initial to estimation sample.
Finishing times Runners Events
#Unique records 5,321,614 1,599,845 10,703
no time provided 19,261








age ¡ 5 1236
age ¿ 85 344
Estimation sample 3,072,309 1,013,398 7,123
—-
Individuals aged lower than 5 (4,122 observations) and higher than 95 (193 observations) have also
been discarded.
This leaves us with 5,296,217 results of 755,574 runners (based on idxRUNNER), . For the major
distances, 5k, 10k, 15k, 10mile, halfmarathon and fullmarathon, these numbers are 3,258,580; 1,106,609
and 7,527, respectively.
B Additional Graphs and Tables
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(a) 5k – 0h20m. (b) 5k – 0h30m. (c) 5k – 0h40m.
(d) 10k – 0h40m. (e) 10k – 0h50m.
(f) 10k – 1m00. (g) 10k – 1h10m.
Figure A1: Distance: 5k and 10k. Distribution of the number of finishing times around a round num-
ber and the fitted counterfactual distribution.
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(a) 1h20m. (b) 1h30m. (c) 1m40.
(d) 1h50m. (e) 2h00m. (f) 2h10m.
(g) 2h20m. (h) 2h30m.
Figure A2: Distance: half marathon. Distribution of the number of finishing times around a round
number and the fitted counterfactual distribution.
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(a) 2h30m. (b) 2h40m. (c) 2m50.
(d) 3h00m. (e) 3h10m. (f) 3h20m.
(g) 3h30m. (h) 3h40m. (i) 3h50m.
(j) 4h00m. (k) 4h10m. (l) 4h20m.
(m) 4h30m. (n) 4h40m. (o) 4h50m.
Figure A3: Distance: marathon. Distribution of the number of finishing times around a round num-
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